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Developmental studies using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) or child-friendly adaptations
of the IGT converged in showing that children and adolescents exhibit a strong bias in
favor of disadvantageous choices whereas adults learn to decide advantageously during
the course of the task. In the present article, we reviewed developmental studies that
used the IGT or child-friendly adaptations of the IGT to show how these findings provide
a better understanding of the processes involved in decision-making under uncertainty.
For instance, developmental studies have underlined that until late adolescence, the
dominant strategy is to focus only on the frequency of punishment and to choose among
options with infrequent losses. Indeed, school-aged children and adolescents’ choices in
the IGT seem to be guided by the loss frequency leading them to fail in distinguishing
between advantageous and disadvantageous options. In addition, recent developmental
studies revealed that adults switch less often after losses than school-aged children and
adolescents. These findings suggest that psychological tolerance to loss may facilitate
learning the characteristics of each option, which in turn improves the ability to choose
advantageously. In conclusion, developmental studies help us refine our understanding of
decision-making.
Keywords: Iowa Gambling Task, emotion-based learning, executive control, inhibition (psychology), children and
adolescents, developmental psychology, loss aversion
INTRODUCTION
In most situations of everyday life, people make decisions in
circumstances where some information about the potential out-
comes of choices are lacking and must be inferred from experi-
ence. Over the last two decades, considerable efforts in the field
of psychology and neuroscience have been leveled at identify-
ing the processes involved in this category of decision-making
situations (Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Dunn et al., 2006). In
particular, from a developmental perspective, a growing body of
research suggests that the ability to decide advantageously evolves
with age (see Table 1; Crone et al., 2005; Cassotti et al., 2011;
Aïte et al., 2012; Beitz et al., 2014). Therefore, in the present arti-
cle, we reviewed these developmental studies to demonstrate how
it helps us refine our understanding of decision-making under
uncertainty.
According to the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) (Bechara
et al., 2000; Bechara andDamasio, 2005), emotion-related signals,
developed from past experience of the emotional consequences
following choices, guide decision making in situations of uncer-
tainty. More specifically, this theory assumes that advantageous
decisions rely on the development of an integral emotional reac-
tivity (i.e., somatic maker). These somatic markers allow one to
avoid disadvantageous options and to develop a preference for
advantageous ones.
Most of the empirical supports for this model came from stud-
ies using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT, Bechara and Damasio,
2005), a task initially developed to simulate the inherent uncer-
tainty of daily-life decisions’ situations through an opaque
gain-loss schedule. The IGT consists of a card game in which
participants are instructed to win as much money as possible by
selecting among four possible decks of cards (labeled A, B, C, or
D). Importantly, the decks’ characteristics are not disclosed, and
should be gradually inferred from feedbacks obtained during the
game. Indeed, feedbacks are provided after each selection so that
participants systematically win some money, but also and unfore-
seeably lose some. The four decks differ in the magnitude of wins
and losses in such a way that to succeed at this game, players must
withdraw from attractive but disadvantageous in the long term
decks (A, B) and opt for less attractive but advantageous in the
long term decks (C, D).
Typically, healthy adults progressively and implicitly learn to
choose advantageously during the course of the task (Crone
and van der Molen, 2004; Dunn et al., 2006; Cassotti and
Moutier, 2010; Cassotti et al., 2011; Turnbull et al., 2014). In
addition, advantageous performances has been linked to an antic-
ipated emotional reactivity, as measured by Skin Conductance
Responses (SCRs). Indeed, healthy participants display gradu-
ally higher anticipatory SCRs before picking a card in disad-
vantageous decks than in advantageous ones, suggesting that
an emotional warning signal leads them to avoid disadvanta-
geous choices (Bechara et al., 2000; Carter and Smith-Pasqualini,
2004; Guillaume et al., 2009). Similarly, anticipatory heart rate
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responses and SCRs were found to be critical to distinguish good
and bad performers in such decision-making under uncertainty
tasks suggesting a key role of this anticipated emotional reactivity
in the ability to make advantageous decisions (Crone et al., 2004;
Denburg et al., 2006).
In agreement with the SMH both neuropsychological stud-
ies and neuroimaging studies have shown the involvement of
specific brain regions implicated in emotional processes in the
IGT (Reimann and Bechara, 2010). More specifically, poor
IGT performance and lower anticipatory SCRs were observed
in amygdala-damaged patients (Bechara et al., 1999) as well
as in patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC)
lesions (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). Using functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging, several studies have reported the activation
of a prefrontal network including the VMPFC in the IGT which
provides convergent evidence that decision-making under uncer-
tainty might rely on an emotional neural circuitry (Lawrence
et al., 2008; Li et al., 2010).
Additional empirical evidences in favor of the SMH came
from studies exploring the influence of the emotional context on
advantageous decisions in the IGT (Hinson et al., 2006; Davies
and Turnbull, 2011; Aïte et al., 2013; see Turnbull et al., 2014 for
a review). In response to remaining critics about the reliability of
electrophysiological measures such as SCRs (Tomb et al., 2002;
Dunn et al., 2006), Aïte et al. (2013) recently designed an emo-
tional priming paradigm of the IGT to determine whether the
ability to choose advantageously in ambiguous situations is driven
by an integral emotional signal as assumed by the SMH. In this
study, the emotional context was either congruent or incongruent
with the feedback delivered after each choice and was manipu-
lated using pictures of either happy or fearful faces (Tottenham
et al., 2009). The results of this study strongly support the SMHby
evidencing that decision making was improved when the integral
emotional signal was reinforced by a congruent emotional context
and impaired when the integral emotional signal was disrupted by
an incongruent emotional context.
CHILD FRIENDLY ADAPTATION OF THE IGT AND
ADVANTAGEOUS DECISION-MAKING
Given that neuroimaging studies over the past 20 years have
consistently shown continuing neuroanatomical and neurofunc-
tional development of the prefrontal cortex across childhood and
adolescence (Crone and Dahl, 2012), numerous developmen-
tal studies examining decision making under uncertainty have
focused on changes in performance on child friendly adaptations
of the IGT between school-aged children and adolescence (Crone
et al., 2005; Cassotti et al., 2011; Beitz et al., 2014).
One of the first studies that investigated developmental
changes in decision-making ability during adolescence showed
that this ability continues to improve until late adolescence and
even in adulthood (Crone and van der Molen, 2004). The authors
of this study have designed an age-appropriate version of the IGT:
the Hungry Donkey Task (HDT), in which the stimulus presenta-
tion was modified to make the task more meaningful for children
(Crone and van der Molen, 2004). Indeed, rather than picking
cards to win money for themselves, participants are invited to
assist a hungry donkey in winning as many apples as possible
by opening doors. Two doors (A and B) constitute disadvanta-
geous choices (resulting in overall loss), and two doors (C and
D) advantageous choices (resulting in overall gain). Critically, this
task maintains the basic format and a similar schedule of rewards
and losses as those described by Bechara et al. (1994). As in other
IGT studies, participants’ performance is measured in terms of
changes in individuals’ net scores for blocks of 20 trials by sub-
tracting the number of choices in disadvantageous doors from the
number choices in advantageous doors.
In a series of behavioral studies, Crone and colleagues have
demonstrated that 6- to 9-year-old children and 10- to 12-year-
old children fail to avoid disadvantageous options during the
course of the task, as opposed to 13- to 15 year-old adolescents,
who gradually learn to choose advantageously (Crone and van
der Molen, 2004, 2007; Crone et al., 2005; Huizenga et al., 2007).
Nevertheless, adolescents’ performance is still suboptimal com-
pared to adults, suggesting that the ability to distinguish between
advantageous and disadvantageous options continues to improve
during late adolescence (Overman, 2004; Overman and Pierce,
2013). Although some authors point out that there may be differ-
ences between the development of decisionmaking involving per-
sonal gain or loss and decision making that leads to help another
such as in theHDT, developmental studies using the standard IGT
have confirmed that advantageous decision making progressively
increases until early adulthood (Hooper et al., 2004; Cassotti et al.,
2011; Beitz et al., 2014). It has been proposed that this age-related
improvement in performance on child adaptations of the IGT
during adolescence may be due the slow functional maturation
of the VMPFC until early adulthood (Crone and van der Molen,
2004, 2007).
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FREQUENCY BIAS
Because the IGT is a complex task, different factors may con-
tribute to the similar decision-making deficit observed in children
and VMPFC patients. In support of this hypothesis, developmen-
tal studies revealed that children have a marked preference for
options associated with infrequent losses, regardless of whether
these options are advantageous or disadvantageous in the long
run (Crone and van der Molen, 2004, 2007; Crone et al., 2005;
Huizenga et al., 2007; Carlson et al., 2009; Cassotti et al., 2011).
Indeed, the four options proposed in the IGT and the child-
friendly versions of this task also differ in the frequency of losses,
with two options associated with a low frequency of losses (10%
for decks/doors B and D) and two options associated with a
medium frequency of losses (50% for decks/doors A and C).
Developmental studies converged in showing that children and
adolescents increasingly opt for choices associated with infre-
quent, rather than frequent losses during the task and that this
frequency bias decreases with age (Huizenga et al., 2007). In con-
trast, adults display a strong preference for low loss frequency
choices early in the task but progressively opt for advantageous
options during the course of the task. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this specific sensitivity to options associated with a low
frequency of losses has not been observed in VMPFC patients.
Furthermore, Crone and van der Molen (2007) demonstrated
that adolescents display higher anticipatory SCRs preceding a
choice among options associated with frequent losses in contrast
www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 915 | 3
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to adults who generate progressively higher anticipatory SCRs
before disadvantageous selections (Bechara and Damasio, 2005).
These results suggest (a) that loss frequency highly influences chil-
dren and adolescents’ decision making, and (b) that children and
adolescents exhibit difficulties in considering both the frequency
and the amount of loss leading them tomake long-term disadvan-
tageous decisions (see also Jansen et al., 2011; van Duijvenvoorde
et al., 2012). Interpreted within the framework of the SMH, these
data suggest that adolescents reactivate the negative emotional
responses associated with high-loss frequency options without
taking into account the final outcome.
Interestingly, recent evidence underlined a comparable inabil-
ity to integrate both loss frequency and final outcome in adults’
decision making (Lin et al., 2009; Cassotti and Moutier, 2010).
For example, using the Soochow Gambling Task (SGT), an adap-
tation of the IGT designed to directly contrast the impact of loss
frequency and final outcome on decisionmaking, Lin et al. (2009)
demonstrated that adults substantially based their choices on loss
frequency rather than on final outcome (i.e., the advantageous
or disadvantageous nature of the decks on the long run). More
specifically, when the frequency of loss in the decks is manipu-
lated to take either one of two extreme values (80 vs. 20%), adults
are guided by gain–loss frequency leading them to fail in dis-
tinguishing between advantageous and disadvantageous choices.
Given that this loss-frequency bias was observed only in children
and adolescents when the classical IGT was used, Aïte et al. (2012)
further explored developmental changes in the ability to consider
both the loss frequency and the final outcome in decision mak-
ing using an age adapted version of the SGT. Results confirmed
that children and adolescent not only preferred choices associated
with infrequent losses in the SGT but also failed to differentiate
advantageous options from disadvantageous ones, a developmen-
tal pattern similar to the one previously evidenced using the IGT.
Contrarily to Lin et al.’s study (2009), findings indicated that
adults did manage to consider the final outcome when making
their decision but only for options associated with low-loss fre-
quency. Thus, adults are not only guided by the loss frequency
but also by the amount of the loss as evidenced by a preference for
the advantageous option among the low-loss frequency options.
Taken together, developmental studies using the IGT, the HDT,
or the SGT converge in showing a robust frequency bias in child-
hood and adolescent that decrease in adults (Crone et al., 2005;
Crone and van der Molen, 2007; Aïte et al., 2012).
STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENTS OF DECISION MAKING
A large majority of previous studies measured performance in
the IGT or child adaptations of the IGT in terms of changes in
difference between the number of advantageous selections and
the number of disadvantageous choices. However, such measures
provide no information on the strategic adjustments that imme-
diately follow gains and losses over the course of the task. Given
that participants can chose any of the four options on each trial,
age differences observed in the standard net score and the ten-
dency to focus on loss frequency could result from age differences
in the strategic exploration of the four options.
In line with this hypothesis, Cassotti et al. (2011) have recently
examined response-switching behavior following rewards and
punishments in children, adolescents and adults. In this study,
adults tended to persevere with the same choice after a win (i.e.,
a “win–stay” strategy) and to shift to a new choice after a loss
(i.e., a “loss–shift” strategy). In contrast, children and adoles-
cents failed to control a spontaneous tendency to explore the
different options as shown by a higher frequency of switches fol-
lowing gains and losses in children and adolescents than in adults.
Another study has not only confirmed these developmental dif-
ferences but has also outlined a possible role for these strategic
adjustments following gains and losses (Aïte et al., 2012). Given
that the proportion of switches after losses correlated negatively
with the number of advantageous selections, the reduced loss-
shift pattern of response observed in adults, as compared to the
two younger groups, could constitute a critical adaptive process
allowing one to choose advantageously. Indeed, adults’ tolerance
to loss may allow them to learn the characteristics of each option
and to increase their ability to consider not only loss frequency
but also final outcome.
In line with these developmental studies (Cassotti et al., 2011;
Aïte et al., 2012; van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2012) computa-
tional models that have included win-stay/loss-shift strategies to
predict performance in the IGT (Worthy et al., 2007; Worthy
and Maddox, 2012) converged in showing that the tendency
to inhibit the loss-shift response is a central component of
decision-making behavior in the IGT. Altogether, these results
suggest that immature decision making may be due to the dif-
ficulty to execute inhibitory control on an automatic loss-shift
response.
CONCLUSION
In the present review, we have discussed how developmental
studies have made significant progress in the understanding of
the processes involved in emotional-based learning in the IGT.
Behavioral and electrophysiological studies have clearly demon-
strated a focus on loss-frequency (Crone et al., 2005; Crone
and van der Molen, 2007) and a preponderance of a loss-shift
strategy in children and adolescent as compared to adults (Aïte
et al., 2012). In line with recent behavioral and neuroimaging
studies (Spear, 2011; Habib et al., in press) children and ado-
lescent might be more focused on loss frequency and might rely
more on a loss-shift strategy because of an exacerbate aversion to
losses. Given that only adults have the ability to choose advanta-
geously (Crone and van der Molen, 2004, 2007; Overman, 2004;
Overman and Pierce, 2013), the subtle developmental differences
regarding the factors that guide decision making and the strate-
gic adjustment that are used might reflect the critical components
needed for making advantageous decisions. Indeed, the data col-
lected in developmental studies suggest that the ability to develop
emotion-related signals that integrate both loss-frequency and
final outcome requires inhibitory control of intuitive exploration
strategies. As such, the present article provides new fuel for
the current debates on the respective contribution of executive
control and emotion-based learning in the IGT.
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